Scientists and government have been working to determine the need for and level of regulation required to address dual-use research.
This document examines various attempts to bring greater awareness to security concerns associated with the life sciences.
A report covering biosecurity issues related to biotechnology development.
This textbook provides information about international thinking on biorisks, including biosecurity and dual-use concepts, into a national context for Pakistan life scientists.
This paper discusses dual use research potential and training in the life sciences.
This Companion Guide comprises a set of tools designed for institutions, principal investigators (PIs), and institutional review entities (IREs) implementing the Policy for Institutional DURC Oversight. Such guidance may also be applied more broadly to research that is not within the scope of these policies but that may warrant review for dual use potential and special oversight.
This report was undertaken in response to the United States Government’s request for advice on the development, utilization, and promotion of codes of conduct for dual use research to life scientists and relevant professional groups.
The strategy articulates a vision for managing the evolving and complex risks associated with technological advances in the life sciences. This policy establishes a series of mutually reinforcing activities to address specific threats as they arise.
US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) developed a framework for guiding HHS funding decisions on individual proposals involving HPAI/H5N1 research with specific attributes.
Policy establishes regular review of US Government funded or conducted research with high-consequence pathogens and toxins for its potential to be dual use research of concern (DURC) in order to mitigate risks and collect the information needed to inform the development of an updated oversight policy.